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Researchers of Britain’s early postwar history of
computing have known for some time that a
series of five British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) radio broadcasts under the general title of
“Automatic Calculating Machines” was broad-
cast on the BBC’s Third Programme radio serv-
ice in May–June 1951. In these broadcasts, five
British pioneers of computing spoke about their
work. In the order of their broadcasts, they were
Douglas Hartree, Max Newman, Alan Turing,
Frederic (“Freddie”) Williams, and Maurice
Wilkes. Apart from Turing’s broadcast, which
has been discussed by B. Jack Copeland1 and
Andrew Hodges,2 these broadcasts have received
little attention from historians of computing. 
No sound recordings of the broadcasts sur-
vive, although they all were recorded on
acetate phonograph discs prior to transmission.
However, texts of all five broadcasts survive as
BBC transcripts, which were taken from the
recordings shortly after they were made. These
transcripts are held at the BBC’s Written
Archives Centre in Caversham, near Reading,
and are the basis for this article.
In addition to the existence of the five BBC
transcripts, three of the speakers’ scripts are
known to have survived. These are Turing’s, held
at the Alan Turing archive at King’s College,
Cambridge, and those of Wilkes and Newman,
copies of which are held by Wilkes. Turing’s
script has been published,3 although curiously
not in the Collected Works of A.M. Turing,4 and is
also available on the Word Wide Web.5 None of
the other scripts has been published.
All five of the speakers in this series were, or
had been, involved with one or more of the
three major computing projects in the UK in
the immediate postwar period:
• ACE (Automatic Computing Engine), at the
National Physical Laboratory, designed by
Turing, launched in 1946 and experimen-
tally operational in a pilot version in 1950,
although not completed until late 1951.6
• EDSAC (Electronic Delay Storage Automatic
Computer), at Cambridge University, designed
by Wilkes, begun in 1947 and operational in
May 1949.7
• Mark 1 Prototype at Manchester University,
associated with Newman, Williams, and
(from 1948) Turing. Operational from April
1949 to August 1950, having evolved from
an earlier “Baby” test machine (operational
June 1948) and replaced in February 1951
by the Ferranti Mark 1.8
Table 1 (see p. 4) gives the titles and broad-
cast dates of the talks, and the computers that
the speakers were associated with at the time of
the broadcasts. 
As Table 1 shows, the Cambridge and
Manchester projects were well represented in
the five broadcasts. The National Physical
Laboratory’s ACE computer project was repre-
sented only indirectly, via Turing, who was no
longer associated with it when he made his
broadcast. This machine was not, in any case,
fully completed at the time of these broadcasts. 
The Third Programme
Before discussing the content of the broadcasts,
I should mention the BBC’s Third Programme, 
on which these five talks were transmitted. This
idiosyncratic radio service—so unlike almost
anything in modern-day broadcasting—occu-
pied an important position in Britain’s intellec-
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Douglas Hartree, Max Newman, Alan Turing, Frederic (“Freddie”)
Williams, and Maurice Wilkes—spoke about their work on BBC radio.
This article examines surviving texts of their broadcasts, and the
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tual life, and an appreciation of its philosophy
sheds useful light not only on the broadcasts but
on the nature and size of the audience that
would, or could, have heard them.
The Third Programme was a national
domestic radio service inaugurated by the BBC
in September 1946 with an avowedly intellec-
tual and cultural character. Two other national
domestic radio services, the Home Service and
the Light Programme, already existed—hence
the name Third Programme. Central to the
activities of the Third Programme were broad-
casts of serious music, literature, and speech.
Many leading thinkers of the day were invited
to speak on the service, and in general the style
of presentation was for the speaker to deliver a
scripted talk typically lasting around 30 min-
utes. (All the talks in this series lasted about 20
minutes.) Interview-style presentations were
unusual, although widely used on the BBC’s
Home Service. The fact that the five broadcasts
were made by the computing pioneers them-
selves, rather than by journalists or commen-
tators, is thus typical of the approach used on
the Third Programme and is what makes them
particularly interesting as historical sources.
The Third Programme had no regular
timetable of program “slots”—there was no reg-
ular time of the week for science broadcasts,
poetry, or anything else. The only way for lis-
teners to find out about forthcoming broadcasts
was to consult the program listings published
daily in newspapers or the BBC’s own weekly
Radio Times. The five computer broadcasts dis-
cussed here, therefore, did not form part of a
regular science and technology stream, and
were not even broadcast at equal intervals or
regular times. They nevertheless were conceived
of and presented as a series, and at the end of
each broadcast there was an announcement of
when the next would take place.
The Third Programme operated only during
the evening, and listeners were not expected to
spend the whole evening listening to the serv-
ice. Indeed, it was considered undesirable for
them to do so. Rather, listeners were expected to
tune in for just the broadcasts that interested
them or which aroused their curiosity, and then
switch off, or listen to another station. As the
BBC’s historian Asa Briggs noted, “The Third
Programme set out not to meet the wishes of lis-
teners who would be engaged in continuous lis-
tening but rather to recruit ‘patrons’.”9
How many patrons the Third Programme
had at the time of these broadcasts is hard to
pin down. In the late 1940s, it was claimed to
be between 1.5 million and 2.5 million.9 A typ-
ical audience for any single Third Programme
broadcast would naturally have been much
smaller than this. In 1949, two years before
these five broadcasts, the audience for a Third
Programme broadcast was estimated to be
around 90,000, and it appears not to have
grown during the next few years.10 Indeed, the
percentage of BBC radio listeners tuning in to
the Third Programme was generally 1 percent
of the total radio audience during the early
1950s.11 The more popularly oriented Home
Service and the Light Programme would typi-
cally have audience figures of a few million for
their more popular broadcasts. The Third
Programme was subject, in any case, to techni-
cal constraints that restricted its coverage to the
more populous parts of the UK. Reception in
many parts of the country was poor, and in
remote areas nonexistent.
Though small in absolute terms, the Third
Programme’s audience was nevertheless influ-
ential, as Britain’s academics, artists, and intel-
ligentsia were disproportionately represented
among it. However, professional intellectuals
were by no means the Third Programme’s only
listeners. A 1949 survey reported that 35 per-
cent of the audience was working class,
although it appears that working class was then
defined more widely, and middle class more nar-
rowly, than would now be the case.12
Radio broadcasts relating to computers,
cybernetics, and artificial intelligence (as we
would now call it) were by no means rare on
the BBC in this period. Between 1946 and
December 1956, there were 24 such broadcasts,
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Table 1. “Automatic Calculating Machines” broadcasts.
Computers associated 
Broadcast Repeat with at time 
date date Speaker Title of broadcast
5 May 1951 24 June 1951 Douglas Hartree “Automatic Calculating Machines” Cambridge, EDSAC
8 May 1951 26 June 1951 Max Newman “Automatic Calculating Machines” Manchester Mark 1 (Ferranti)
15 May 1951 3 July 1951 Alan Turing “Can Digital Computers Think?” Manchester Mark 1 (Ferranti)
2 June 1951 4 July 1951 Freddie Williams “Automatic Calculating Machines” Manchester Mark 1 (Ferranti)
5 June 1951 10 July 1951 Maurice Wilkes “The Use of Automatic Calculating Machines” Cambridge, EDSAC
not counting repeats. Most of these broadcasts
date from after 1950, and most were on the
Third Programme. Speakers in these other
broadcasts included Norbert Wiener, Colin
Cherry, Wolfe Mays, Frank H. George, and
Christopher Strachey.13 The extent of this cov-
erage of computer-related matters is perhaps
surprising given the widespread perception in
the UK that press and broadcasting personnel
are biased against (and ignorant of) science and
technology. However, computer-related broad-
casts on the Third Programme were probably a
special case owing to the particular interests of
their producer, to whom I will later return.
The broadcasts
Although much of the Third Programme’s
output was broadly educational, the Third
Programme was not part of the BBC’s educa-
tional service. Third Programme broadcasts were
therefore not didactic in the usual sense, and
speakers were encouraged to address the listener
as an equal who just happened not to be con-
versant with the speaker’s subject. Accordingly,
none of the speakers in this series pitched his
talk at a high technical level, and none adopted
the style of a formal academic lecture where one
might expect a progression of ideas from funda-
mentals to higher-level concepts. In this respect,
the style of these broadcasts was similar to that
used for other factual talks (not just science
talks) on the Third Programme at that time. In
general, the speakers confined themselves to
fairly simple factual accounts of what comput-
ers were and what they did. As so often, howev-
er, Turing was something of an exception. His
presentation, although not of a high technical
level, certainly made greater demands on the lis-
teners’ comprehension.
With the exception of Williams, the speak-
ers said relatively little about the hardware,
concentrating instead on software concepts
such as programs, data, subroutines, and so on,
and also touched on the recurring theme of
what a program in principle could and could
not do. As regards the prehistory of computing,
no speaker referred to wartime code-breaking
activities, although Williams did mention the
importance of wartime radar research for the
development of computers. The names of
Charles Babbage and Lady Lovelace (that is,
Ada Byron, mathematician and associate of
Babbage) are occasionally invoked as important
pioneers, but those of John von Neumann, J.
Presper Eckert Jr., and John Mauchly are not
mentioned at all. Their absence was probably
more out of consideration for the listener, to
whom those names would have meant little,
than out of chauvinism. Hartree and Wilkes, in
particular, were happy to pay tribute to these
American pioneers in their writings.
It cannot be claimed that the broadcasts sig-
nificantly change our view of the history of
computing. The transcripts of them do never-
theless offer a valuable insight into the rela-
tionship of the then emerging field of
computer technology to the public under-
standing of that technology, as revealed
through the mouths of its leading British prac-
titioners. It is against this background that the
broadcasts are most profitably viewed. Through
the broadcasts we get a sense of what the speak-
ers thought was significant in their work, what
might be comprehensible to a nonspecialist
audience, and where developments might lead.
Significantly, we also get repeated reassurances
about where the work was not likely to lead—
toward the “electronic brains” so frequently
invoked in popular journalism of the time.
Once again, however, Turing was something of
an exception.
In the space of this article, it is impossible to
discuss each broadcast in depth. In the follow-
ing five sections, therefore, I summarize each
broadcast through quotations and commen-
tary, taking the broadcasts in the order in
which they were made. Because the transcripts
were made by nonspecialist clerical staff, there
are occasionally places where the transcriber
has clearly misinterpreted what the speaker has
said. In my quotations I have corrected such
misinterpretations without comment, and in a
few places I have adjusted the punctuation to
something more appropriate for a written pres-
entation. Occasional interpolations of my own
are enclosed within square brackets.
Douglas Hartree
The first speaker in the series, Douglas
Hartree, had broadcast about computers on the
BBC five years earlier, in December 1946, on
the Home Service. In his earlier broadcast, he
had mainly been concerned with the ENIAC
machine, which he had recently used during a
visit to the US.
At the time of his 1951 broadcast, Hartree
was Plummer Professor of Mathematical
Physics at Cambridge University, although in
the immediate prewar period he had been asso-
ciated with developments in analog computing
at Manchester University, particularly the dif-
ferential analyzer.14 His inaugural lecture at
Cambridge had been titled “Calculating
Machines: Recent and Prospective Develop-
ments,” and he had already published various
writings relating to digital computers, notably
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his account of the ENIAC machine in Nature15
and in his book Calculating Instruments and
Machines.16
In his May 1951 broadcast, Hartree was con-
cerned at a basic level with the differences
between computers and other sorts of machine.
He described the parts of a computer, the rela-
tionship between data and information in
terms of the computer’s operation, and the
tasks computers could be made to do (such as
calculating, playing games, and other appar-
ently human-like activities). He began by
emphasizing three salient points about the
machines that were to be the subject of this
series of talks: that they were automatic, gener-
al purpose, and digital. Only the first two of
these three points were elucidated:
By an “automatic machine” is meant one which
can carry out numerical calculations of any
length without the attention of an operator,
once the schedule of operations to be carried out
has been supplied to the machine, in a suitable
form; and by a “general-purpose machine” is
meant one which can be used for a large
number of different kinds of calculations, by
supplying it with the appropriate schedules of
operating instructions.
The third of Hartree’s introductory points, the
digital nature of computers, was not expanded
(although Newman enlarged on it in the sec-
ond broadcast).
The concept of a general-purpose machine
can be traced back to Babbage’s proposed ana-
lytical engine. Hartree was aware of Babbage’s
work and mentioned it in passing as represent-
ing the first conception of a general-purpose
digital machine. He then launched into the
anatomy of the modern (that is, von
Neumann) machine:
An automatic digital calculating machine con-
sists of five main parts, an arithmetical unit, a
store, a control unit, an input unit, and an out-
put unit. The purpose of the store is to hold
information, either numbers or operating
instructions, for as long as they may be required,
in the course of the calculation. In some of the
older machines, the store consisted of two dis-
tinct parts, one for numbers and one for instruc-
tions. But in most of the more recent machines,
the same store is used both for numbers and for
instructions.
By “the older machines” Hartree was refer-
ring to machines such as the Automatic
Sequence Controller at Harvard University, in
which data was held on counters and instruc-
tions on punched paper tape that was read as
the calculation proceeded, or the ENIAC, in
which the “program” was assembled physically
by setting switches and by patching together
processing units via plugboards and cables. The
more modern machines not only held instruc-
tions and data in the same memory, but made
no distinction in the way they were held:
But in most of the recent machines there is no
distinction between the form used for numbers
and for instructions. The distinction between
words representing numbers and words repre-
senting instructions lies in the way in which they
are used.
A consequence of this lack of distinction
between data and instructions is the possibili-
ty of self-modifying programs (something on
which more than one speaker was to com-
ment):
This possibility of modifying instructions as the
calculation proceeds provides the means of
instructing the machine to carry out much of the
discrimination and selection between alternative
procedures which a human computer would
exercise in doing the same calculation by pencil
and paper methods.
Hartree raised here the contentious issue of the
analogy between humans and computers.
From the announcement of the ACE project in
autumn 1946 (the first of the British comput-
ing projects to be announced publicly), the
press had had a tendency to refer to the new
computers as “brains,” or “electronic brains.”17
Hartree was anxious to correct what he viewed
as a misapprehension:
But do not jump to the conclusion that [in mod-
ifying its own program] the machine is thinking
for itself. All these instructions for modifying
other instructions, and for evaluating and using
the criteria of any discrimination, have to be
thought out and programmed in detail. The
machine only carries out literally and blindly
and without thinking, the instructions which
the programmer has thought out for it.
Turing, later in the series, took a different
view, as we shall see.
Martin Campbell-Kelly18 has written that
one of the distinctive features of computing as
done at Cambridge at this time was the empha-
sis on building up a library of commonly used
subroutines. Hartree alluded to this policy: 
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… the machine and the process of providing it
with instructions may be such that groups of
operations for standard processes, such as the
evaluation of square roots and cube roots, can be
programmed once and for all. […] The main
work in the preparation of the calculations for
the machine may then be the programming of a
master routine consisting mainly of instructions
for calling in the subroutines in the proper
sequence.
Hartree concluded by mentioning the pos-
sibility of computers playing games such as
chess, but he would not regard this as evidence
of thinking:
… [playing games] would come very near what,
in ordinary speech, we would call thinking—an
aspect of those machines on which I understand
Dr. Turing will be speaking. But remember, that
the sequence of operations for such a process still
has to be programmed, and Lady Lovelace’s
words still apply—“the machine can only do
what we know how to order it to perform.”
This remark of Lady Lovelace’s is a recurring
theme in the first three broadcasts, with each
speaker giving a different verdict on its veracity.
Max Newman
The mathematician Max Newman had
worked on breaking German Enigma–coded
messages at Bletchley Park during World War II
along with Turing, who had been one of his
students at Cambridge University before the
war. At the time of his 1951 broadcast,
Newman was professor of mathematics at
Manchester University, and his interest in com-
puting was mainly with a view to their use as a
mathematics research tool. Although Newman
had largely initiated the project to build a com-
puter at Manchester, he had little involvement
with the design of its hardware.19
In his talk, Newman was concerned with
what made computers so powerful. He located
their power in the fact that they used a limited
set of elementary operations, and any sequence
of operations could be repeated until a stipu-
lated condition was satisfied. 
At the start of his talk, he picked up
Hartree’s idea of the general-purpose machine,
which could perform a wide range of tasks
despite its relatively small repertoire of ele-
mentary operations:
It is the arrangement of these elementary opera-
tions, and the way they are interrelated, that
causes us to call one series [that is, program] a
way of solving equations, and another a routine
for playing bridge. [….] Problems that appear not
to be arithmetical at all may often be made so, by
quite trivial changes in the way they are stated.
However, the existence of a set of elementary
operations is not by itself what gives a com-
puter its power:
If an automatic computing machine really need-
ed a tape containing 100,000 instructions in
order to do 100,000 elementary operations,
somebody would have to punch the tape; and
that “somebody” might be just as usefully
employed in doing the 100,000 elementary sums
himself, with a pencil and a piece of paper.
This is perhaps debatable. Even if a task with
100,000 operations required a program tape
containing 100,000 instructions, there might
still be a benefit in creating the tape because
the program could be used many times to
process different sets of data. As far as Newman
was concerned, however, the utility of a com-
puter lay in the fact that a multistep operation
can be specified in fewer steps than the opera-
tion itself would take:
The machines that are the subject of this talk […]
all have the essential property of being able to do
a big job from a few instructions. … [The]
arrangements by which this is achieved are the
most characteristic feature of these machines,
and are the source of those complexities of
behaviour that give some colour to comparisons
with certain mental processes, […].
Newman went on to mention the “jump”
instruction as one technique for doing “a big
job from few instructions,” by enabling a
sequence of operations to be repeated:
The normal procedure, when the machine is start-
ed off, is for the instruction in line 1 to be carried
out first; then control passes to line 2, the instruc-
tion in it is carried out, control passes on to line
3, and so on. … [There] is a special type of instruc-
tion whose function is precisely to interrupt the
normal succession. For example, Instruction 100
might be “Jump back to instruction 25.”
Of course, one needs to be able to exit from
the loop created by jumping back to an earlier
instruction:
There must be some way of bringing the repeti-
tions of a cycle to an end when they have gone
on long enough. […] This is accomplished by
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introducing a conditional or branched type of
instruction, for example: “If line 27 is empty (i.e.,
contains 0) step on to the next instruction in the
normal way; but if it is not empty jump to
instruction 12.”
Such accounts of conditional jumps have a
way of being couched in anthropomorphic
terms, which Newman wished to counter:
Now there is some danger here that the jargon of
“obeying instructions” and “choosing alterna-
tives” which has become the customary way of
describing the behaviour of these machines, may
evoke a picture of the machine “conning” [that
is, reading and memorizing] the branched
instruction, looking to see if line 27 is empty, and
then faithfully choosing the appointed alterna-
tive. In fact the machine “obeys” its instructions
in exactly the same sense that a railway train
“obeys” the points [that is, switches], going to
Crewe if they are set one way and to Macclesfield
if the other.
Presumably, Newman intended his railway
analogy to suggest that a program can no more
vary its route during a calculation than can a
train driver during a journey: Once a program
and its data are read into a computer, the future
course of the data-processing operation is as
completely determined as is the route of a
train. However, the analogy is potentially mis-
leading. The course of a train is knowable in
advance, but this is not necessarily true of a
computing program’s calculations, as Newman
himself said later (quoted below).
Like Hartree, Newman saw self-modifying
programs as holding an intriguing possibility
for something close to what we would now call
artificial intelligence:
The machine will add lines 2 and 3, if instructed
to do so, without the least regard to whether one
or the other of these lines is to be used later on as
an instruction. This means that we can modify
not only the true numerical material, but also the
instructions themselves, in the course of the com-
putation. […] This has, with some justification,
been described as the ability to learn from results.
However, whereas Hartree was clear that
such self-modifying programs could only “lit-
erally and blindly” carry out the programmer’s
instructions, Newman was less certain:
It is not difficult to make up programmes of
moderate length leading to networks of opera-
tions so complex that even the composer [that
is, programmer] cannot predict what course the
calculations will take, and it is not obvious that
anyone could discover a routine to obtain the
results of such a programme […]. In view of these
facts it seems that the dictum of Lady Lovelace,
as quoted by Professor Hartree, that “the
machine can only do what we know how to
order it to perform,” needs to be received with
some reserve. However the end of my talk is not
the place to enter on these fascinating but con-
troversial topics.
Alan Turing
By the time of Turing’s broadcast, roughly a
year had passed since the publication of his
now famous Mind article in which he discussed
the issue of whether computers could be said to
think.20 At the outset of his broadcast, Turing
made it clear where he stood:
Digital computers have often been described as
mechanical brains. Most scientists probably
regard this description as a mere newspaper
stunt, but some do not. One mathematician has
expressed the opposite point of view to me rather
forcefully in the words “It is commonly said that
these machines are not brains, but you and I
know that they are.” […] I shall give most atten-
tion to the view which I hold myself, that it is
not altogether unreasonable to describe digital
computers as brains.
Much of the rest of the talk is a summary of
Turing’s justification for regarding computers
potentially as brains, and the kinds of reason
that people put forward to oppose the sugges-
tion that computers might one day be able to
think. Of these objections, the principal one is
Lady Lovelace’s argument that computers only
do what they have been programmed to do.
Turing was careful to make clear that the
computers of his day could not plausibly be
called brains; his point is that digital comput-
ers had the potential for being plausibly regard-
ed as brains. His argument, familiar from the
Mind article, depends on the concept of the
universal machine, which he had conceived in
connection with his celebrated 1936 paper,21
although he did not mention that paper here:
A digital computer is a universal machine in the
sense that it can be made to replace any
machine of a certain very wide class. It will not
replace a bulldozer or a steam-engine or a tele-
scope, but it will replace any rival design of cal-
culating machine, that is to say any machine
into which one can feed data and which will
later print out results.
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The next step of Turing’s argument depends
on a view of the brain that remains controver-
sial, although it has a long ancestry in materi-
alist philosophy:
If it is accepted that real brains, as found in ani-
mals, and in particular in men, are a sort of
machine, it will follow that our digital comput-
er, suitably programmed, will behave like a brain.
The success or otherwise of this emulation
is to be assessed in the test that now bears
Turing’s name, which he explained in his Mind
paper and which he summarized here briefly:
I think it is probable for instance that at the end of
the century it will be possible to programme a
machine to answer questions in such a way that it
will be extremely difficult to guess whether the
answers are being given by a man or by the
machine. I am imagining something like a viva-
voce examination, but with the questions and
answers all typewritten in order that we need not
consider such irrelevant matters as the faithfulness
with which the human voice can be imitated.
Allowing the computer to respond non-oral-
ly, via a typewriting machine, suggests that
Turing thought the problem of programming a
computer to speak convincingly was even more
challenging than that of programming it to
respond plausibly to questions. Turing’s own
work on speech sampling and encipherment,
in the latter part of World War II, may have led
him to view speech synthesis as a particularly
intractable problem.
Given Turing’s view of the potentially brain-
like behavior of computers, it is perhaps no sur-
prise that he considered they might one day be
capable of originality:
If we give the machine a programme which
results in its doing something interesting which
we had not anticipated, I should be inclined to
say that the machine had originated something,
rather than to claim that its behaviour was
implicit in the programme, and therefore that
the originality lies entirely with us.
Turing acknowledged that there are
immense difficulties to be overcome before a
computer could behave in a convincingly
human way, nor did he know how one would
go about programming a machine to behave in
such a way:
I will only say this, that I believe the process
should bear a close relation to that of teaching.
The essential point of Turing’s observations
on the difficulty of programming brainlike
behavior is that the programmer may not
always know what the consequences of a pro-
gram may be:
Let us now reconsider Lady Lovelace’s dictum.
“The machine can do whatever we know how to
order it to perform.” The sense of the rest of the
passage is such that one is tempted to say that
the machine can only do what we know how to
order it to perform. But I think this would not be
true. Certainly the machine can only do what we
do order it to perform, anything else would be a
mechanical fault. But there is no need to suppose
that, when we give it its orders, we know what
we are doing, what the consequences of these
orders are going to be.
Thus whereas Hartree accepted the Lovelace
dictum and Newman felt reservations about it,
Turing rejected it—or at any rate rejected what
it is usually taken to imply. For Turing, the fact
that a program together with its data is a deter-
ministic system (that is, its initial state fully
determines its route to its final state) does not
preclude brainlike or original behavior because
we cannot necessarily predict what that final
state will be and how it is reached.
Turing’s talk was the only one of the series
for which I have been able to find a review.
Writing in The Listener, a weekly BBC publica-
tion, Martin Armstrong wrote:22
… I was moved every few minutes to hold up my
schoolboy hand with a “Please, Sir … One
moment, Sir …. Will you explain what you mean,
Sir, by …” this that and the other. Mr Turing
remarked that many people dislike the idea that
a machine could be made to think. “If machines
could think,” they say, “where would we be?
Now I, as it happens, am one of those who dis-
like the idea, not, however, because it frightens
me, but because it seems to me to be based on a
misuse of words. To say that a machine thinks is
surely, by implication, to define thought as a
mechanical process, …
One can sympathize with the reviewer’s dif-
ficulties in following Turing’s talk, which was
certainly the densest of the series. To have
grasped all Turing’s points on a single hearing
would not have been easy.
Regarding the definition of “thinking” or
“thought,” which the reviewer had trouble
with, Turing did actually give a sort of defini-
tion in his talk, although it would have been
easy to miss:
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… to programme a machine to imitate a brain,
or as we might say more briefly, if less accurate-
ly, to think.
Turing’s comment here explicitly, if approx-
imately, equates imitating a human brain with
thinking, which is rather different from what
we find in his Mind article. In that article,
Turing stated that he did not want to be drawn
into defining “thinking,” and proposed his test
as a way of avoiding the ambiguities associated
with the word. What the test actually tests is
not stated explicitly in the Mind article,
although commentators have usually inter-
preted it as an operational test of either
machine-based intelligence or machine-based
thought. The informality of this radio presen-
tation, however, appears to have encouraged
Turing to use the terms “thought” and “think-
ing” in connection with machines rather more
openly than he did in more formal contexts.
Here are two further examples:
I will not attempt to say much about how this
process of “programming a machine to think” is
to be done.
I have tried to explain what are the main
rational arguments for and against the theory
that machines could be made to think …
Earlier, I mentioned that Turing’s broadcast
has been discussed by Hodges and Copeland.
Hodges’s discussion is confined to a few sen-
tences pointing out that Turing reiterated in his
broadcast ideas he had already expounded else-
where, principally in the Mind article. This is
true, but the broadcast at least presented a con-
cise summary of those ideas, aimed at a nonspe-
cialist audience. Copeland’s discussion is much
longer, and for the most part is less concerned
with the broadcast than with the interpretation
of the phrase “any machine” (taken from the
broadcast). Copeland devotes a few paragraphs
to Turing’s suggestion that the appearance of free
will in a computer may be created by the inclu-
sion of a random process in the program, but
this portion of Turing’s talk was relatively short.
Freddie Williams
Freddie Williams’s down-to-earth talk could
hardly have been in greater contrast to Turing’s.
Williams was an electrical engineer who, along
with Tom Kilburn, had devised the highly
innovative cathode-ray tube memory used in
the Manchester Baby machine, the Mark I pro-
totype, and the Ferranti Mark I (installed
February 1951).23 His talk was almost entirely
concerned with the principles of computer
memory, of which—leaving aside electronic
memory—there were really only two practical
types at the time of the broadcasts: mercury
delay lines and cathode-ray tube devices.
After briefly describing the power of com-
puters to do large-scale calculations at high
speed, Williams outlined the engineering prob-
lem faced by the designer of computer memory:
Thus the problem reduces to finding somewhere
to put strings of 0’s and 1’s, about half a million of
them altogether, and it must be somewhere where
they can be got at in sets of 20 or 40 within say a
thousandth of a second when they are wanted.
The Cambridge EDSAC machine and the
ACE machine used batteries of mercury delay
lines for their memory. These were tubes of
mercury down which pressure waves were
transmitted. The operation of these devices was
likened by Williams to a man shouting to a dis-
tant cliff face:
If he shouted a number and then listened, after a
certain time he would hear an echo. He could then
shout the number again, the only tax on his mem-
ory would be between hearing an echo and shout-
ing again; after a further delay he would again hear
an echo and shout, and so keep the number circu-
lating between himself and the cliff. If the echo
were delayed a longish time he could shout sever-
al numbers before the first one came back and so
keep several numbers in circulation. Thus one
man with a poor memory could store a lot of num-
bers in the air, just by repeating what he heard.
Williams acknowledged that this analogy is
only appropriate up to a point. In a practical
mercury tube, the data (in the form of ultra-
sonic pressure waves) are not echoed back to
the transmitter along the tube. Instead, they
are received by a transducer at the far end of
the tube which
… returns the signals to the near end electrical-
ly, where they are regenerated and retimed rela-
tive to the clock by an electrical circuit.
The cathode-ray tube memory, in contrast,
arranges the data two-dimensionally in space:
Imagine a man supplied with a square of dust
subdivided by low walls into a lot of little squares,
just like an egg box, and supplied also with a stick
to scratch the dust. Now let him be read a row of
0’s and 1’s and let him start at the top left-hand
box and progress from box to box from left to
right and top to bottom, as in reading, writing
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“1” when we say “1” and “0” when we say “0”.
In the electrical version the man, the stick,
and the square of dust are replaced by a cathode-
ray tube […] The square of dust is the face of the
cathode-ray tube, the dust on it is the inex-
haustible supply of secondary electrons that can
be knocked out of it by a high velocity primary
electron beam. This beam is itself used as the
stick, and it is moved about in much the same
way as in television …
The electron beam not only wrote data into
the memory but also read it. By scanning the
screen, the beam could detect excited and
unexcited regions of the screen, as in a televi-
sion camera of the sort used in those days.
A snag with this sort of memory was that
data in the memory tended to be corrupted by
what Williams referred to as the “splashing of
secondary electrons from one box to its neigh-
bours,” and therefore the image on the screen
needed regular regeneration:
We have found that over a thousand separate
“boxes” can be set up on one cathode-ray tube
before the “splashing” from box to box makes
the fading between regenerative visits of beam
too great to be tolerated.
William’s cathode-ray tube memory was a
formidable engineering achievement and sim-
ilar types of memory were used not only in the
UK (in early Ferranti machines) but also in the
US, where it was used in, for instance, the
Whirlwind machine at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology during its early years.
Nevertheless, computer memory remained an
awkward and unreliable technology:
But neither [mercury delay-line nor cathode-ray-
tube memory] really solves the whole problem,
since to store 500,000 digits would require no
less than 500 [cathode-ray] tubes or [mercury]
delay lines. We have progressed beyond this
point by using in conjunction with cathode-ray
tubes secondary methods of storage which lack
the property of extremely rapid access to indi-
vidual numbers.
Possibly Williams was here alluding to the
innovative magnetic-drum storage used at
Manchester. Even this combination of cathode-
ray tube memory with other forms of storage
left much to be desired:
But the ideal has not been reached—in fact one
may well conclude by saying, “the research
continues.”
Within a year or two, research into comput-
er memory (mainly in the US) yielded a new
type that, as Wilkes put it in a September 2001
interview with me, rapidly transformed the
memory from being the least reliable part of a
computer into being the most reliable. This was
magnetic-core memory, which used arrays of
thousands of small magnetic rings threaded on
current-carrying wires. However, practical
applications of such memory were still in the
future at the time of these broadcasts.
Maurice Wilkes
The final speaker in the series, Maurice
Wilkes, was at the time of the broadcasts run-
ning what was probably the most successful of
the three British computer ventures, not only
from the technical point of view but also from
the organizational point of view. By mid-1951
the Cambridge EDSAC, designed by Wilkes,
was not just a functioning laboratory machine
but a facility used by several departments of
the university.24
Wilkes’s talk concentrated on the scientific
use of the EDSAC machine:
Already the EDSAC has contributed to a number
of [research projects]. Astronomy and astro-
physics are represented by problems connected
with the orbits of minor planets and the equilib-
rium of gaseous stars, geophysics by calculations
concerning the propagation of wireless waves in
the ionosphere, and the effect of the motion of
a ship on a pendulum used for gravity survey at
sea. The machine has also been used for statisti-
cal calculations arising in applied economics and
for problems in X-ray crystallography. We are
about to start on a problem connected with the
transmission of impulses along nerve fibres.
As mentioned, a distinctive feature of
Wilkes’s policy at Cambridge was the early cre-
ation of a large library of subroutines:
You may be interested to know that when a high-
speed electronic calculating machine is being
used, it is generally better to calculate sines and
cosines afresh from a series whenever they are
required rather than to put a table into the store
of the machine. It has also proved possible to
construct sub-routines for carrying out some of
the standard processes of numerical mathemat-
ics, such as numerical integration, or the numer-
ical solutions of differential equations. […] The
library associated with the EDSAC now contains
about 150 sub-routines and it is still growing.
For comparison, the subroutine library at
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Manchester at the time of this broadcast was
about one-third the size given here by Wilkes.25
The EDSAC library was, in fact, highly influen-
tial and adopted directly by some later
machines such as the LEO machine, used by
the J. Lyons Company, and the TAC machine
in Tokyo.26
Another of Wilkes’s concerns was to stream-
line, and even mechanize, the business of pro-
gramming:
There are a number of other tasks connected with
programming which at first sight appear to require
the application of human intelligence but which
can really be done according to a set of rules.
Not surprisingly, given the large amount of
computing activity that had been going on at
Cambridge, issues of programming errors and
reliability had started to loom large:
When drawing up a programme it is very easy to
make slips of a trivial kind; for example, one may
forget to make sure that the accumulator register
of the machine is cleared before beginning to
add up a series of numbers. You might think that
these slips could all be detected by going through
the programme carefully before putting it on the
machine, but experience has shown that it is not
quite as simple as that. Some of the slips are sure
to get through and a good deal of the time taken
in putting a new problem on the machine is
spent in finding them.
Some commentators, or perhaps users, were
worried that the computer itself might intro-
duce errors in calculations. Wilkes said:
… it has even been suggested that the ideal com-
puting system would consist of two identical
machines connected together in such a way that
unless they produced identical numbers at each
stage the calculation would stop. I am rather
against this for electronic machines at their pres-
ent stage of development, mainly because the
machines are quite complicated enough as it is
without making them any more so. The EDSAC,
for example, contains 3000 valves [tubes]. The
more equipment there is in a machine, the more
likely it is to go wrong.
The likelihood of a machine breaking down
was indeed high. In the EDSAC’s early days, the
interval between failures was typically a matter
of minutes, although reliability steadily
improved.27
In rounding off his talk, Wilkes was also
rounding off this series of five broadcasts:
That the future will bring important and excit-
ing developments, I do not doubt, but it must be
remembered that from the point of view of prac-
tical achievement the subject is still in its early
stages; the number of electronic digital calculat-
ing machines in operation at the present time
can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and
no machine has yet been programmed to play a
game of bridge.
Context of the broadcasts
To help take stock of this series of broad-
casts, it is useful to look at the wider context in
which they took place.
The broadcasts were examples of the topical
interest in computers coinciding with the
emergence of working computers in Britain
around 1949–1950. Other manifestations of
the same interest can be seen in the article
“Can Machines Think?” that Wilkes wrote for
the Spectator around this time,28 and the articles
published in Penguin’s Science News.29 Both of
these publications would have been aimed at
the same audience as the Third Programme
reached—that is, well-educated nonspecialists.
At a more populist level, there was the Ferranti
computer displayed at the Festival of Britain
(May–September 1951), which aroused a great
deal of interest. Members of the public could
challenge it to a game of Nim—a simple game
in which opposing players take turns to remove
one, two, or three counters from an initial
arrangement of 13 pieces. The winner takes the
last counter. In all these cases, the issue of
mechanical intelligence was never far away,
and frequently alluded to—as is the case with
the five broadcasts discussed here. Clearly in
the lay mind, or in the minds of the people
who were addressing the lay mind, this issue
could not be ignored.
Aside from this rather sensationalist interest,
however, the broadcasts were timely in anoth-
er respect. The Cambridge and Manchester
machines were beyond being laboratory novel-
ties when these broadcasts were made, and for
some time had been earning their keep as sci-
entific and mathematical tools. The Manchester
machine, for instance, besides being used by
Turing for his research, was available for outside
research projects such as the UK’s first atomic
bomb project.30 As for the Cambridge machine,
Wilkes’s broadcast summarized some of its
research uses. For some months, indeed, Wilkes
had been thinking about a replacement
machine, funds for which were being canvassed
at the time of his broadcast.31
Another context in which to consider these
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broadcasts was the Third Programme itself and
its relationship to other BBC radio services.
(Television was still very much a minority
medium throughout most of the 1950s in the
UK.) It is at the very least surprising that the
Third Programme, which carried no regular sci-
ence output, carried these broadcasts and sev-
eral others relating to computers, whereas the
Home Service, which broadcast a weekly sci-
ence program, should have had relatively few
broadcasts on the subject (only four significant
broadcasts in the period 1950–1955). In my
view, several factors account for this.
To a degree the Home Service’s science-mag-
azine approach would have been more strong-
ly driven by news values than was coverage on
the Third Programme, and although comput-
ers were “new” during the early 1950s, they
ceased to be news as they evolved from being
laboratory projects into scientific tools. Also,
the Home Service’s own news bulletins (as
opposed to science broadcasts) would probably
have covered computers at their most topical
and newsworthy moments. There was, for
instance, an item on a Home Service news
broadcast on 9 December 1946 covering the
announcement of the ACE project. The Third
Programme, by contrast, was not so concerned
with the news agenda and did not even carry
news bulletins during that period. Thus, by
being less driven by a news agenda, the Third
Programme’s coverage could afford to be more
reflective and long term.
The most significant factor in the Third
Programme’s coverage, however, appears to
have been a remarkable producer of talks on the
Third Programme: Theophilus Stephen Gregory.
He was responsible not only for the five BBC
broadcasts but also for most of the other com-
puter-related broadcasts on the Third
Programme during this period. Gregory was a
singular character, having been a Methodist
minister during the 1920s, later converting to
Roman Catholicism.32 His particular areas of
interest were philosophy and theology, and it
seems probable that the contemporary debates
about “electronic brains” caught his attention
in a way that they might not had he simply
been a science-trained producer of science
broadcasts. For instance, a year before the five
broadcasts, Gregory had produced two talks
entitled “Mind-like Behaviour in Machines,”
both given by Donald M. MacKay, a physicist at
King’s College, London, with a particular inter-
est in the compatibility of science and religious
faith. Later broadcasts produced by Gregory had
such titles as “On Comparing the Brain with
Machines” (two broadcasts, again with MacKay
as the speaker), “Machines and Human
Behaviour” (with Frank H. George), and so on.
Further evidence of the philosophical nature of
Gregory’s interest in computers can be found in
a continuity announcement that survives with
the BBC transcripts and which would have been
written by Gregory himself (the emphasis in the
following quote is mine):
This evening we are repeating the first of five
talks on the history and theory of thinking
mechanisms ….
Whatever the particular bias of Gregory’s
interest in the subject, however, he appears to
have made no attempt to influence the broad-
casters in the content of their talks, if the expe-
rience of one speaker can be taken as typical.
Wilkes reported in the September 2001 inter-
view with me that Gregory gave him no brief-
ing about his talk, and made no intervention
apart from requesting him to alter the pronun-
ciation of certain words (to no benefit, in
Wilkes’s view).
Approximately seven months after the series
of talks discussed here was broadcast, Turing
and Newman took part in another computer-
related broadcast produced by Gregory on the
Third Programme. This was a panel discussion
entitled “Can Automatic Calculating Machines
Be Said To Think?,” broadcast on 14 January
1952 and repeated on 23 January 1952.33 Other
participants included Geoffrey Jefferson, a pro-
fessor of neurosurgery at the University of
Manchester, and Richard Braithwaite, a
philosopher and Fellow of King’s College,
Cambridge. However, apart from this panel dis-
cussion, none of the broadcasters mentioned
here took part in any further computer-related
broadcasts on the BBC. Other broadcasts relat-
ing to computers continued to be made, how-
ever, and often by distinguished speakers.
As for the significance of these broadcasts to
either the development of computing in
Britain, or to the public understanding of the
subject, these are imponderable matters pend-
ing further research. However, one concrete
outcome deserves mention, even if it could not
be said to be typical. After hearing Turing’s
broadcast, enterprising amateur computer
enthusiast Christopher Strachey—at the time a
teacher at Harrow School—dashed off a letter
to the speaker:34
Dear Turing,
I have just been listening to your talk on the
Third Programme. Most stimulating and, I sus-
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pect to many people, provocative, but it fits
extraordinarily well with what I have been think-
ing on the subject.
The remainder of Strachey’s four-page letter
consists of his observations on the idea that
making a computer think would be similar to
the process of teaching, a matter touched on in
passing by Turing and clearly related to
Strachey’s professional interests as a teacher. In
closing, Strachey wrote:
Please excuse such a long letter—I am quite sure
you are far too busy to answer it—you must
blame your talk for being far too stimulating.
Strachey’s letter thus stands as an example
of the power of this type of broadcast to stim-
ulate and illuminate. Nor was this letter the
end of the matter for Strachey. He went on to
become a remarkable theorist of computer pro-
gramming and the founder, in the 1960s, of the
Programming Research Group at the Oxford
University Computing Laboratory.35 Although
I would not wish to imply that Strachey’s sub-
sequent career was entirely attributable to his
hearing Turing’s talk, the talk was nevertheless
part of his intellectual background and an
inspiration to him. Fittingly, Strachey was him-
self later to broadcast at least three times on
computer-related matters on the BBC.
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